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Theorists who study discourses are interested in the social construction of reality through talk and text.
The discursive construction of reality occurs at different (though interconnected) levels - from transient
and situated instances and episodes oflanguage use (Potter & Wetherell 1987), through to the
circulation of durable sets of interrelated knowledge claims, usually created and maintained by certified
experts attached to institutions such as schools, universities, hospitals, prisons and courts (Foucault
1972, 1978). In this paper, we explore some aspects of these different dimensions ofdiscourse, through
a consideration of the creation, circulation and use of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), a
popular personality typing tool. We argue that closer attention to the characteristics ofdiscourses and
the practices that surround them - that is, how they are created, maintained and structured - can help us
to understand how they work to construct reality across a variety of contexts.
Discourse and discourse
Several theorists from quite different fields have analytically differentiated between transient and
enduring dimensions of discourse, and explored how they are interrelated. Firstly, in a discussion ofthe
cultural dissemination ofpsychoanalytic knowledge, Teri Walker (1988) made what she called a
'practical and pragmatic distinction only' between (lower case) discourse as 'speech and everyday talk'
and (upper case) Discourse as a 'discipline or body of knowledge' (p. 78). She noted that 'the two
forms of discourse do not exist in isolation but each forms and informs the other, in tension'. She
examined how Freudian ideas have influenced our understanding and explanation of human nature and
behaviour, and observed that 'what is said in Discourse becomes sayable in discourse [and] saying in
discourse becomes, or stands for, what has been said in Discourse' (p. 76).
Secondly, in the sociology of education, Basil Bernstein (1999) differentiated between 'horizontal
discourse' which 'is likely to be oral, local, context dependent and specific, tacit, multi-layered, and
contradictory across but not within contexts' (p. 159) and 'vertical discourse' which
takes the form of a coherent, explicit and systematically principled structure, hierarchically
organized, as in the sciences, or it takes the form of a series of specialised languages with
specialised modes of interrogation and specialised criteria for the production and circulation of
texts, as in the social sciences and humanities' (ibid).
Horizontal discourse is segmented and transient, in that there is no fixed, overarching formulation
through which actors attempt to stabilize knowledge claims across different contexts. Vertical
discourse, on the other hand, can be recontextualized in different times and places, in ways that enables
it to retain a relatively stable set of meanings. This does not happen automatically, but is the result of
numerous practices and procedures that regulate the production, evaluation and circulation of
knowledge.
Thirdly, and more closely related to the field of organizational studies, Matts Alvesson and Dan
Karreman (2000) identified a variety of ways that discourse is understood and studied in their (our)
field. They categorized them according to two dimensions - the degree to which analysts present
discourse as coupled to meanings (for example, does discourse construct or determine subjectivity, or is
there a self that is separate from talk and text about it?), and the social level or scale at which discourse
is studied (from highly localized micro instances oflanguage use to broader, more enduring macro
systems for making sense). In discussing the second dimension, Alvesson and Karreman also used
lower and upper case 'ds' to distinguish between micro and macro forms ofD/discourse. However, in
their scheme they did not, as Walker and Bernstein did, specifical1y associate Discourse with webs of
professional practice and formalized bodies of 'expert' knowledge. Instead, they viewed it more
broadly, as 'an assembly of discourses, ordered and presented in an integrated frame' (p. 1133) or 'a
more or less universal connection of discourse material.[..].more or less standardized ways of referring
tolconstituting a certain type of phenomenon, ego business re-engineering, diversity or globalization'
(pp. 1133-34). They claimed that it is very difficult for organizational theorists to move up and down
what they call the 'ladder ofdiscourse' - that is, to account for discourse and Discourse in the same
study. The problem, in their view, is when to move from one to another. When, for instance, do
statements about globalization stop being isolated and context-specific instances of discourse and
become manifestations of a broader Discourse?
In this paper, we suggest that it is possible to explore discourse and Discourse together, and indeed that
attempts to do so may enhance our understanding ofhow reality is constructed through D/discursive
practices. To do this, however, we need to move away from the somewhat diffuse understanding of
Discourse offered by Alvesson and Karreman to one that is closer to that proposed by Walker and
Bernstein above. In other words, we need to view Discourse as not Gust) an aggregation and integration
of multiple instances of discourse, but also as a solidification and formalization of selected aspects of
discourse, that render it capable of sustaining a relatively stable set of meanings across time and space.
The selection, solidification and formalization ofa D/discourse is an outcome of work done by people
who create and circulate it - 'experts' of all kinds who seek to stabilize knowledge claims and have
them taken up and used (but not appreciably altered) by others. In this view, the shift from discourse to
Discourse, and back again, is not just a matter ofjudgement on the part of organizational theorists, but
an active accomplishment of the people we are studying.
The MBTI as Discourse and discourse
To expand and illustrate our argument, we will consider the characteristics ofone particular
D/discourse that is often used in organizations and elsewhere - the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator ®
(MBTI). The MBTI is a set of questions that sorts the people who complete it into one of 16
personality types. It was initially developed in the United States during and after the Second World
War by two American women - Katherine C. Briggs and her daughter Isabel Briggs Myers. The METI
and its accompanying documents and practices sort people according to 'the way [they] prefer to use
their minds' (Myers 1980, p. 1, emphasis in original). The preferences it examines are arranged along
four dichotomies as follows:
1. Extraversion (E) versus Introversion (I), or 'relative interest in ... outer and inner
worlds',
2. Sensing (S) versus Intuition (N) - whether people perceive through their senses or
through 'indirect perception by way of the unconscious',
3. Thinking (T) versus Feeling (F) - whether people make decisions using logic or
personal, subjective values, and
4. Judging (1) versus Perceiving (P). This refers to a general 'method ofdealing with the
world'. Judging people like to order their lives, while perceiving people embrace
uncertainty and ambiguity (ibid., pp. 2-9).
The description of the MET! given above is an account of its characteristics as a Discourse. Its reliance
on dichotomies is a symptom of a widespread human propensity to organize knowledge around
contrasts and opposites. Our self-conscious creation and use of a distinction between Discourse and
discourse also exploits the explanatory possibilities generated by viewing phenomena as ifthey were
arranged along an imaginary spectrum linking two dichotomous categories. Our purpose is not to reify
the categories or the link between them, but to use them as explanatory tools to examine uses,
mobilizations and interpretations of the MET! in a variety of contexts. Drawing on the work of Walker
and Bernstein and (to a lesser extent) Alvesson and Karreman, we define Discourses as sets of formal
statements outlining the 'official' professionally sanctioned version of a body of interconnected
knowledge claims. Discourse appears in textbooks, handbooks and sets of official guidelines. For our
purposes, its most important characteristic is its capacity to retain relatively stable meanings across
time and space. At the other end ofthe spectrum is discourse, which we define as localized statements
that represent personalized and individualized engagements with Discourse. Lower case discourse is
concerned with individual situations, beliefs and responses. It is a customized version of Discourse,
'true' for specific times and places, but not necessarily applicable to a range of diverse situations. There
is of course a large grey zone where Discourse merges into discourse, for instance, in training sessions
and workshops where METI teachers and presenters create, through graphs, diagrams and verbal
performances, situated knowledge claims that draw on and reproduce the official, written Discourse.
To illustrate these distinctions, we draw on some data that we have collected from a company in which
many employees have been typed according to the MET!, and where the typology's jargon has become
part of every day conversation. 1 A booklet used in the company (Myers 1998) provides a source of
official METI Discourse. It describes the typology, its origins and underlying principles. It devotes a
page to each of the 16 types, outlining their characteristics and 'Potential areas for Growth'. Within this
Discourse, we read, for instance, that 'ISTJs have a profound respect for facts'. They are perceived to
be 'consistent and orderly'. However, they can 'become rigid about time, schedules, and procedures'
(p. 11). On the other hand, INFPs are described as 'sensitive, concerned and caring'. They 'find
structures and rules confining and prefer to work autonomously'. They can 'be impractical' (p. 24). In
I The first two authors spent more than 1,000 hours over a period of two years in the company
observing meetings, participating in workshops and conducting informal and formal conversations and
interviews. As part of the broader research project, the first author conducted semi-structured, taped
one-to-one interviews with 16 managers who had attended a residential 'leadership' course that
introduced them to the MET!. Interviews lasted from 4S to 90 minutes.
an interview with the first author of this paper, Sue, a middle manager in the company and an INFP,
drew on this Discourse to explain some of the difficulties she had encountered at work:
It's not OK to be an INFP in this business ... The guy I first worked for when I started as a
trainee was a raging ISTJ and wouldn't let me go home at the end of the day without all the
filing done. So for years that's the way I thought you worked, and I was seventeen when I
started. So it took me probably six months to accept that it's OK to be an INFP. They're nice
human beings, and you're actually allowed to be one, and it doesn't mean that you're weird or
you're soft or you're strange.
Sue's discourse draws on and reproduces, albeit in a personalized and customized form, the official
Discourse contained in the MBTI handbook. The difference between her discourse, and the formal
Discourse (in our admittedly artificially imposed scheme) lies in the level of generality of the
statements within them. Sue's discourse is about a particular INFP in a particular situation. In the
MBTI Discourse, statements are general and detached from context. According to the logic of the
Discourse, ISTJs respect facts and INFPs are sensitive whether they work in a coal mine in Australia or
an accounting firm in Canada. As Walker noted, discourse and Discourse feed off and reinforce each
other. There are important tensions between them, however. Exploring these tensions is a fruitful way
of investigating the means through which power is mediated through D/discourses in organizations and
society more generally. In order to explore this further, we would like to attempt a brief climb up and
down the ladder of discourse. The MBTI 'works' because it is simultaneously stable and customizable.
How was this stability achieved, how was the Discourse spread, and what makes it so readily
customizable in different settings?
Creating and Maintaining Discourse by Stabilizing 'Facts' and Policing their Uses
The MBTl is a relatively small and self-contained, but also widely dispersed and popular, fragment of
the vast and varied discursive domain of the psychological sciences? Scholars in the Foucauldian
tradition have highlighted the importance ofpsychological Discourses and practices for contemporary
forms of governance that oblige people to know and manage themselves (Henriques et al. 1998, Rose
1996, Townley 1993). Instruments (tests) that measure and sort people into categories are an integral
part of the disciplinary apparatuses associated with this type ofknowledge. As Nikolas Rose (1996, p.
90) noted, 'The test becomes a tiny but highly transferable diagram of a procedure for the inscription of
human difference into the calculations of authority'. Psychological tools act as 'techniques for the
disciplining ofhuman difference: individualizing humans through classifying them, calibrating their
capacities and conducts, inscribing and recording their attributes and deficiencies, managing and
utilizing their individuality and variability' (Rose 1996, p. 19, emphasis in original). Foucault's own
comments (1982, p. 212) on 'the form of power that makes individuals subjects' are also relevant:
2 Most academic psychologists consider the MBTI to be marginal to, or outside, the mainstream of
psychological knowledge. Among the reasons for this are the unconventional nature of its initial
development (by people not associated with the academic psychologists, particularly in prestigious
universities), its unconventional use of psychometrics (e.g. bipolar rather than continuous scales of
measurement), and its association with both C.G.Jung (generally not seen by US academics as part of
mainstream psychological thought) and the notion of personality typologies (generalisations about
traits of whole populations being the standard psychometric approach).
This fonn of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the individual,
marks him (sic) by his own identity, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on
him which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him.
Moreover, by opening up and suggesting areas for improvement (or 'Potential areas for Growth', as in
the MBTI handbook cited above), the MBTI can act as a 'technology of the self (Foucault 1988, p. 18)
Foucauldian interpretations such as these are valuable for capturing how Discourses mediate power
through knowledge (Foucault 1978, p. 100). However, they do not have much to say about how
Discourses are produced in the first place, or how they are spread and maintained. How do transient
and situated statements about human nature (observations by Jung, for example, or Briggs' and Myers'
early adaptations ofJung's ideas) become codified into 'truths' that are solid and enduring enough to
shape knowledge and practice across many different sites? To explore this question, we need to 'follow
the actors' (Latour 1987) as they create and evaluate new facts and instruments, and attempt to stabilize
and circulate them.
The origins of the MBTI can be traced back to Katherine Briggs' interest in personality types. 3 In
1923 she encountered CG Jung's book Psychological Types (1921/1971). She was impressed with
Jung's ideas and expected that professional psychologists in the US or elsewhere would tum them into
a practical personality-typing tool. However, this did not occur, possibly because psychologists in the
US were more interested in behaviourism, and psychologists in Europe, including Jung, were not
interested in quantification. The outbreak ofWorld War 2 stimulated Briggs and her daughter, Isabel
Myers, to 'do something that might help peoples understand each other and avoid destructive conflicts'
(Black 1980, p. x). Although they were not fOlmally trained in psychology or mathematics, they
decided to transfonn lung' s ideas into a psychometric tool. This work was performed predominantly
by Myers. who acquired sufficient statistical expertise to carry out the task. She worked on various
Forms of the MBTI from 1942 until her death in 1980. The first 'official' version of the questionnaire
(ponn C) appeared in 1943, and was copyrighted in the same year.
In her early development of the tool. Mvers conducted private research in which she tested out
questions and developed the questionnaire using her own and family resources and networks. while
also offering occasional licenses for use (to Hay in 1944 and Mackinnon in 1948). In 1956, she signed
a contract with the Educational Testing Service, a recently-founded publisher of psychological
instruments, mostly for use in education. This facilitated further development of the tool, and its
dispersal to a wider audience. In 1962, a manual was published to assist interpretation ofan updated
questionnaire. The MBTI was licensed for translation into Japanese in 1968, and is now available in
more than 30 languages. In the early 1970s, people who were interested in the MBTI began to create
fonnal organizations to pursue research and carry out other MBTI-related activities. A Typology
Laboratory was established at Florida University in 1972. This later became the Center for
Applications ofPsychological Type (CAPT). In 1975 Consulting Psychologists Press took over the
publication of the questionnaire, thus facilitating further expansion of the MBTI network. Another
interest group, the Association for Psychological Type, was fonned in 1979. There are now
Associations for Psychological Type in Australia, Britain, France, Korea, New Zealand, Singapore,
South Africa and elsewhere. The first conference specifically on the MBTl was held in 1975. Biennial
conferences in the US (refened to as International) have followed. with US Regional conferences and
equivalents in other countries. Over time, the MBTI has become increasingly popular and widespread.
3 This account of the history of the MBTl is partly drawn from Geyer 1995, which adopts an actor-
network approach (Latour 1987) to the analysis ofthe development of the instrument.
According to the web-site of the Center for Applications of Psychological Type, approximately two
million people complete the MBTI each year world wide (www.capt.org). There is now abundant
MBTI information on the internet.. In May 2002, for instance, a search for "Myers-Briggs Type
Indicator" on the Google search engine yielded 21,900 pages.
It is clear that a great deal of work has gone into creating, extending and protecting the networks that
circulate and maintain the MBTI. Briggs' and Myers' initial interest in lung's typology may have gone
nowhere, had they not succeeded in enrolling the Educational Testing Service, psychologists at Florida
University and numerous others into their cause. As Bruno Latour noted:
The problem of the builder of 'fact' is the same as that of the builder of 'objects': how to
convince others, how to control their behaviour, how to gather sufficient resources in one place,
how to have the claim or the object spread out in time and place. In both cases it is others who
have the power to transform the claim or the object into a durable whole (1987, p. 131).
In other words, 'facts' and 'objects' on their own do nothing. There is nothing within the MBTI itself
that caused it to move from 1940s Washington to a manufacturing plant in Australia in the 1990s, or
indeed into a conference paper on Organizational Discourse in 2002. Discourse is maintained and
spread through networks of action. As Latour noted, a crucial problem for fact-builders (creators and
maintainers ofDiscourse) is how to control this action. How to ensure that the Discourse remains
relatively stable, so that it does not mutate into something else as it is passed through the network?
Latour investigated how fact-builders try to control the behaviour and perceptions ofothers. One of his
major contributions to social theory has been to highlight the role of material objects in the collective
construction of reality. The MBTI would not exist were it not for the printed questionnaires that are
used to type people, and the various handbooks and guidelines that outline how results are to be
interpreted and used. These paper objects (now supplemented with digital versions) hold the network
together, and ensure that ISTJ and INFP mean roughly the same things in Korea and South Africa as
they do in the UK and the US. In Latour's terms, the questionnaires and associated documents are
'immutable mobiles' - consistent, durable, two-dimensional representations of a slice of 'reality' that
can be easily transposed from one context to another without significant loss of meaning (Latour 1990,
Geyer 1995).
The relative stability of the MBTI is also maintained by rules that (try to) limit and control the
conditions of its use. The questionnaires are protected by copyright law, and are only supposed to be
administered by registered psychologists or people who have been accredited through certified training
programs. Such policing of its uses, however, requires constant work, and is highly unlikely to control
all instances ofMBTI use. For example, in the company in which we conducted field work, we
observed managers who had learned about the METI attempt to guess the types of their colleagues and
conduct speculations about as to how they would react in certain situations. As the MBTI has become
more popular and widespread, its uses and meanings have become more difficult to control. This
problem has become particularly acute since the advent of the internet. The home-page of the US
Center for Applications of Psychological Type (www.capt.org) carries this message (downloaded 18
May 2002):
ATTENTION: Although there are numerous sites on the Internet that purport to offer
information on the MBTI®, we encourage you to seek out legitimate providers ofMBTI®
resources and services. Many psychological type instruments posted on the Internet have not
undergone reliability and validity testing, which ensures accuracy of instrument results. For
links to some of the legitimate MET!® sites, please go to Related Organizations.
'To Classify is Human' - From Discourse to discourse and back again
Immutable mobiles work because they formalize and abstract elements from a messy reality and
arrange them into a form that is not only transportable, but that also helps people in new contexts to
'make sense' of themselves and their environment in novel and sometimes productive ways.
Thus, Sue could attribute the discomfort she felt at work to her having being trained by 'a raging ISTJ'
boss to adopt work habits that were antithetical to her INFP preferences. According to Sue, the MET!
enhanced her appreciation of 'why other people seem to be so organized and I'm not. And that's OK,
and understanding that that's OK'. Karl Weick argued that the construction of identity is a fundamental
aspect of sense-making, and that it is driven by perceived needs for self-enhancement, self-efficacy and
self-consistency. Feelings of dissonance, as experienced by Sue, act as stimuli to sense-making
activities (1995, pp. 20-24).
But what is it about the METI that facilitates such activity? Weick has also written about how sense-
making is 'focused on or by extracted cues' which are 'simple familiar structures that are seeds from
which people develop a larger sense of what may be occurring' (1995, p. 49-50). Briggs' and Myers'
construction of the MET! involved extracting and manipulating cues from the populations they studied
in Washington during the 1940s and 1950s. These cues consisted of choices among questionnaire items
that were made to point to, and stand for, broader patterns ofpsychological type. The questionnaires
and associated documents enable the extraction and interpretation of cues in a wide variety of
situations. The array of questionnaire choices made by an individual links the particular (his/her
personality) to the general (psychological type). Extraction and interpretation of cues involves
categorization, sorting and classification.
The characteristics and capacities of systems of formal knowledge, such as those used to categories and
sort, have recently been active areas of research in the sociology of scientific knowledge (Berg 1997,
Bowers 1992, Bowker & Star 1999, Star 1995). Rather than deconstructing these systems because they
always, inevitably, fall short of complex reality, these scholars seek to explore their 'generative power'
(Berg 1997). That is, what makes them useful? Why do people keep creating and using lists,
procedures, databases, standards, and classificatory schemes? Such activity is ubiquitous, and often
habitual. Indeed, the introduction to Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Star's book on the sociology
and politics of classification is titled 'To Classify is Human'. In it, they point out how routinely we
classify objects. 'We sort dirty dishes from clean, white laundry from colorfast, important email to be
answered from e-junk' (1999, p. 2). Our computers, offices, homes and cities could not exist without
the myriad systems of formal knowledge that facilitate their creation and operation (that is, when they
are not broken or otherwise unworkable).
For Bowker and Star, standards and classification schemes are neither neutral nor innocent. They
create 'social and moral order' (p. 3). According to Bowker and Star's definition, classification is 'a
spatial, temporal, or spatio-temporal segmentation of the world'. They continue: 'A "classification
system" is a set of boxes (metaphorical or literal) into which things can be put to then do some kind of
work - bureaucratic or knowledge production' (p. 10). Ideally, classification systems exhibit three
properties (ibid.):
1. 'There are consistent, unique classificatory principles in operation'. That is, there are formal or
informal 'rules' for relating cues (particularities) to categories.
2. 'The categories are mutually exclusive'. For example, in the METl, people fall into only one of
16 possible psychological types. They cannot be belong to more than one category.
3. 'The system is complete'. The 16 types generated by the four dichotomies covers the entire
range ofhuman variability. There are no other types of people (at least not within the MBTl).
Individual cases do not, however, always fall neatly into categories. Borderline, marginal and
unclassifiable cases (transgender humans, surrogate mothers) frequently generate flurries of concern
because they throw our often unacknowledged and implicit classificatory schemes into disarray (Star
1991).•W!t~~n_theMETI, a few people elude classification. They are considered to be undifferentiated
in their preferences. - - - ... ... - - _. - - - _.. - . - - - - ... ..... - - _. - .. - -
Categorizations have social, political and moral consequences. Sue's perception of herself, and her
place in the company, was altered because of the MBTI. Rather than perceiving herself as deficient
because she was disorganized and somehow different to her colleagues, she could consider herself
(after some struggle) to be a normal INFP ('you're actually allowed to be one') working in an
environment dominated by ISTJs. Bowker and Star thus reinforce Foucault's argument that ostensibly
'neutral' and 'scientific' forms of knowledge mediate power because they construct their subject
matter. They alter the shape of what is visible and knowable, sick and the healthy, normal and deviant.
In the company in which we carried out our fieldwork, consultants and HR personnel deliberately used
the MBTl to try to alter perceptions of deviance and normality (Garrety et al. submitted, Badham et al.
submitted). Interest in the METI was intensified by a 1994 consultant's report that identified the
company as an ISTJ organization. This was not surprising, as it employed many engineers and
technicians, and ISTJs are reputed to favour that type of work (Myers 1980, pp. 149-164). By the mid-
1990s, however, some senior managers and human resources personnel began to perceive the
dominance ofISTJ-like behaviour, with its reserve, respect for tradition, and emphasis on logic, as
problematic. In their view, an ISTJ company was not well-equipped to deal with rapid change, and its
typical manager lacked 'people skills'. At workshops that introduced middle managers to the MBTl,
consultants attempted to use the device to alter perceptions of desirable and undesirable behaviour.
Sally, a female engineer4 related her experience as follows:
There were about thirty of us and they split us up into four categories. There were two guys and
myself in one group and then there were the other groups. Most were in the IJ category. I was in
the EP group. I remember them saying that this category of three people - the EPs - are the
doers and the other people were systems and procedural people. They then said we need more
people in the organization like these three. If you had more people in this category as leaders
then [the company] would be a very dynamic workforce, because you need doers in leadership.
4 It is interesting that the illustrative extracts that we have used in this paper come from two of the
three women we interviewed. The number of managers we interviewed was small - 3 women and 13
men. Within this sample, the women, as interview subjects, engaged in more personal reflection than
the men. They were much less inclined to (somewhat mechanically and impersonally) identify with and
reproduce the company rhetoric - as more than half the men did. The personal responses of the women
may have been influenced by the fact the interviewer was also female. Alternatively, it is possible that
the women's more personalised sense-making was stimulated by their doubly marginal status (deviant
in MBTI type as well as gender) in the company. Ifso, this affirms Weick's observation that sense-
making is stimulated by feelings of dissonance. At this stage of our research, these speculations are
necessarily very tentative. Nevertheless they suggest interesting possibilities for future research on
factors which influence the ways people draw on Discourses to make sense of local, private troubles.
Unfortunately they tend to use us doers as doers all the time, so you don't get into a leadership
position because they rely and depend so much on you going out and doing things. That's fine,
but I'm sure that we doers can certainly be effective in leadership too. You need the two to
complement, right? [... ] So, yeah, I probably gained a lot from the course on that. But I don't
think the procedural and systems people have really taken that out of the lesson.
This is another example of Discourse being turned into discourse. In the process, the MBTI was
simultaneously recontextualized, personalized and reproduced. The space between Discourse and
discourse is where actors attempt to impose, or challenge or alter, social and moral order through
systems of classification. In this case, it seems as though the attempt was not a great success, even
though Sally does seem to draw some pride from being recognized, by the consultant at least, as a
'doer' and therefore a source of dynamism within the company.
Sally's final statement - that, in her view, the 'procedural and systems people' have not, after all,
learned to value their dynamic EP colleagues, is significant. It illustrates why an examination of
relationships between Discourses and discourses is important. Discourses do not construct reality in
any simple or deterministic fashion. The MBTI may indeed (attempt to) 'render human difference
technical' (Rose 1996, p. 90). It may be used to calibrate, inscribe, manage and utilize individual
variability (Foucault 1982, Rose 1996). However, not everyone is equally manageable. Foucault
recognized this of course, but he did not explore the detailed forms that resistance and ambivalence
took. Although he frequently stated that power is mediated through myriad social interactions (the
'microphysics' of power) his refusal of dualisms meant that he turned his attention to other issues ..
Conclusion
This paper is, in part, a theoretical outline for a research project that we hope to conduct in the next few
years into the way power is mediated through the D/discourse of the MBTI. Preliminary research in a
company where people use the MBTI has suggested that subtle power shifts can be engendered by
reconfiguring identities and relationships through the device. However, MBTI use in the company was
highly variable and often different to that outlined in the 'official' Discourse versions. These
observations suggest that the power of Discourses do not lie in the Discourses alone. That is, they do
not, in and of themselves, compel particular patterns of belief and ways of behaving. To explore the
variety of 'realities' that a D/discourse is capable of producing, we need to examine how the generic
and the particular interact - how people draw on, subvert, reinterpret and reproduce the D/discourses
they encounter. Ifwe focus solely on the content of a Discourse (for example, statements outlining
'Potential Areas for Growth' in an MBTI text), we risk overestimating the power it carries and
homogenizing its effects (Gabriel 1999, Knights & McCabe 2000). We also ignore the massive
amount of social negotiation and sheer work that it takes to construct, maintain, circulate and control
Discourses and their associated practices.
The MBTI is, perhaps on the surface, an easy D/discourse to study because its jargon and its
interrelated knowledge claims are readily identifiable. It is also relatively discrete and circumscribed.
These qualities mean that we can 'follow' it around - from the various institutions that publish it and
attempt to control its meanings and uses to the many sites where it is used in organizational
development programs to the private reflections ofpeople who have encountered it. A study of how it
features in the professional strategies of various organizational actors becomes feasible, as do
explorations of how a diverse range of people use it to reconfigure self-understandings and
interpersonal relationships. In this way, we aim to contribute empirical richness to our understanding of
how D/discourses construct the objects about which they purport to produce knowledge.
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